Measuring the Accessibility of Domain Name Encryption and its Impact on Internet Filtering

Most online communications rely on DNS to map domain names to their hosting IP address(es). Previous work has shown that DNS-based network interference is widespread due to the unencrypted and unauthenticated nature of the original DNS protocol. In …

How Great is the Great Firewall? Measuring China's DNS Censorship

Abstract: The DNS filtering apparatus of China’s Great Firewall (GFW) has evolved considerably over the past two decades. However, most prior studies of China’s DNS filtering were performed over short time periods, leading to unnoticed changes in the GFW’s behavior. In this study, we introduce GFWatch, a large-scale, longitudinal measurement platform capable of testing hundreds of millions of domains daily, enabling continuous monitoring of the GFW’s DNS filtering behavior. We present the results of running GFWatch over a nine-month period, during which we tested an average of 411M domains per day and detected a total of 311K domains censored by GFW’s DNS filter.

An Empirical Study of the I2P Anonymity Network and its Censorship Resistance

In this blog post, we summarize the outcomes of our project entitled “An Empirical Study of the I2P Anonymity Network and its Censorship Resistance” supported by the Open Technology Fund - Information Controls Fellowship Program. 0. Introduction The Invisible Internet Project (I2P) is one of the most well-known and widely used anonymity networks. I2P can be used by privacy-conscious Internet users to protect their online privacy, or by censored users to bypass censorship conducted by local Internet regimes.